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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF COMMON
LAW PLEADING.
A. C. UMBRIT, A.M., L.L.B.,
Professor of Law, Marquette University.
INTRODUCTION.
A pleading is a statement, in logical and legal form, of a cause
of action or the grounds of a defense, terminating in a single
proposition affirmed on one side and denied on the other.
An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by
which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or
protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the
punishment of a public offense. (Code.)
A cause of action is the ground on which an action may be
sustained and includes the fact or combination of facts which
gives rise to and sustains a right of action.
Common Law Pleading is the form in which the issues were
presented to common law courts of justice for determination.
Great exactness and technical niceties were developed, used
and insisted upon and the merits of the controversy were fre-
quently lost in the maze of technicalities.
DEMURRERS.
General, Demurrers.
I. A demurrer is not a plea but an excuse for not pleading.
i. A demurrer is so far a pleading as to preclude a judg-
ment for default.
2. Pleading and demurring to the same pleading formerly
resulted in the expunging of both and judgment fol-
lowed as by default.
II. A demurrer reaches only defects apparent on the face of the
pleading challenged.
III. A demurrer admits all the material facts well pleaded.
i. If a defendant demurs he admits, not by his demurrer
but by his omission to deny, all the material well pleaded
facts averred in the declaration, and if the demurrer is
over-ruled the case is in the precise condition it would
have been if he had suffered a default.
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(a) A demurrer admits the allegations as to the law of an-
other state, special or general customs, but not allega-
tions contrary to legislative acts and records, of which
courts take judicial notice.
i. A plea which contradicts a verdict is no plea and is
therefore demurrable.
(b) A demurrer does not admit facts contrary to common
knowledge.
i. If specific facts alleged contradict general allegations,
demurrer will not admit the truth of the general allega-
tions.
IV. A demurrer does not reach objections that do not necessarily
and clearly -appear on the face of the pleading challenged.
i. In deciding a demurrer superfluous allegations will be
ignored.
V. A plea which contains repugnant allegations respecting a ma-
terial matter is bad on demurrer.
VI. A demurrer does not admit conclusions of law pleaded.
i. Demurrer does not admit conclusions pleaded from facts
alleged.
2. The soundness of the conclusions to be drawn from the
facts pleaded is the very question raised by the de-
murrer.
VII. Legitimate inferences from the facts alleged will be drawn
to resist a demurrer.
(a) A copy of an instrument attached to a pleading but not
made a part thereof will not be considered on demurrer
to contradict allegations of the pleading.
VIII. The office of a demurrer is to raise issues of law upon the
facts stated in the challenged pleading and not to state
facts.
i. It is not permissible to set out extrinsic facts in a de-
murrer.
IX. On a demurrer to one count of a pleading, statements in
other counts cannot be considered to sustain the pleading.
i. Each count is a separate and distinct declaration and a
complete cause of action.
2. Upon demurrer to a declaration the court cannot con-
sider any statement in the plea or subsequent pleading
nor in any other part of the record.
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3. Only that part of the record upon which the demurrer
arises will be considered in deciding a demurrer.
X. A plea professing to answer the whole declaration, but an-
swering only a part, is demurrable.
i. If demurrer is sustained or over-ruled, the court has
discretion, on application, to permit pleading over.
2. On demurrer to several pleas sustained as to some and
over-ruled as to others, such action is a decision only
pro tanto, unless one plea is sufficient as a bar to the
whole action when the decision on such plea is decisive
of the whole.
3. If for improper joinder of two counts demurrer will be
over-ruled if one count is bad and stricken out.
4. If a separate demurrer to each count or to each of
several pleas, the demurrer will be over-ruled or sus-
tained according as to each count is good or bad.
5. No demurrer is allowed to part of a single cause of
action or defense. Proper proceeding is a motion to
strike out.
6. A plea purporting to answer a declaration containing
two or more counts, is demurrable if not an answer to
every count.
7. If several parties join in a demurrer to the same plead-
ing and pleading is good against any one of them, the
demurrer is over-ruled.
8. A demurrer to a joint affirmative plea will be sustained
if the plea is bad as to any co-defendant.
Special Demurrers.
Under an early English statute it was attempted to abolish the
confusion and defeat of justice which had resulted from the prac-
tice growing out of the decisions affecting demurrers generally
by providing that the judges upon issues raised by demurrer
should decide the question on the merits, overlooking mere im-
perfections or irregularities unless the party demurring specially
and particularly alleged the particular defect relied on; it was
further provided that upon writ of error no judgment should be
reversed for mere matters of form or mere irregularities.
i. While there were special demurrers at common law
they served no useful purpose and were seldom used
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since a party so demurring could take advantage of no
other defect except the one specially alleged.
2. Upon general demurrer a party could take advantage
of all kinds of defects, excepting duplicity only. Gen-
erally, demurrers were taken orally.
3. Even this early statute was interpreted so narrowly by
the courts that further legislation was necessary to ac-
complish the purpose of compelling the decision of de-
murrers upon the merits.
I. A pleading dilatory and not to the merits will be eliminated on
demurrer.
i. If the demurrer to a plea in abatement is sustained, the
judgment is not final but that the defendant answer
over.
2. If a plea in abatement is traversed and the verdict is
for the plaintiff, the judgment is that the plaintiff re-
cover, not that the defendant plead over.
3. A plea in abatement is one which sets up matter tend-
ing to defeat or suspend the action or proceeding, but
which, if sustained, does not bar the plaintiff. It does
not go to the merits of the action but rather to the
procedure.
Effect of Demurrer in Opening the Record.
I. A demurrer opens the record, that is, reaches defects in any
prior pleading.
i. On demurrer to a pleading judgment should be given
against the party who committed the first substantial
fault.
2. On a demurrer to any pleading any prior pleading in
the line back to the declaration may be attacked and
hence a demurrer to a reply strikes not only the plea
but the declaration also.
II. Even if original demurrer is overruled and demurrant pleads
over, if his pleading is demurred to, the sufficiency of the
declaration is again at issue.
i. The decision on a demurrer to a declaration does not
preclude the defendant from objecting at the trial that
the declaration alleges no cause of action.
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III. While a party cannot plead and demur at the same time, he
may plead two pleas at different times and the party
finally interposing a demurrer must take the consequences
of an opening of the whole record.
IV. If on the opening of the record by reason of a demurrer it
appears plaintiff relies for his cause of action on adver-
sary's plea, he must fail because he must recover, if at all,
upon his own pleading.
V. A defective pleading may be cured by the subsequent plead-
ing of the adversary and that such pleading was so cured
may appear on demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment,
or writ of error.
i. Although a statement of a claim is demurrable because
of the omission of a material allegation, if the defend-
ant, instead of demurring, pleads a denial of the missing
averment and verdict is found for the plaintiff, the de-
fect is cured.
2. A party by his subsequent pleading may destroy the
effect of his prior good pleading; e. g., a good count
in ejectment followed by a bad plea will be ruined by a
replication disclosing an insufficient title in plaintiff.
(a) If a party can trace back the vice in the pleading to
the first fault he has a right to take advantage of it on
demurrer.
DEFAULT.
I. A default, like a demurrer, is a constructive admission of the
truth of the adversary's pleading.
i. Although a defendant by reason of his default cannot
introduce evidence, the plaintiff is generally not entitled
to judgment until he has made out his case by proof.
2. If the claim is liquidated the plaintiff, upon defendant's
default, is entitled to judgment for the amount claimed.
If the claim is unliquidated, a jury must assess the
damages.
II. A default does not render a defective declaration sufficient.
i. Generally judgments on default are either arrested or
reversed if the declaration is insufficient.
III. A default, like a demurrer, does not admit the truth of su-
perfilous allegations nor legal conclusions.
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NEGATIVE ANSWERS OR PLEAS BY WAY
OF TRAVERSE.
I. A traverse must contain an affrmative and a negative allega-
tion, otherwise it is argumentative and demurrable.
II. A denial of legal conclusions or consequences is insufficient.
III. A denial of immaterial matter, not affecting the gist of the
action, is insufficient.
IV. When declarations allege several matters in the conjunctive,
the denial must be in the disjunctive. Otherwise such de-
nial will amount to a negative pregnant.
i. A denial of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the allegations in the declaration is suffi-
cient, while a denial of knowledge or information as to
the truth of all of the allegations or as to each and
- every allegation is bad since it implies knowledge or
information as to one or more of them.
V. Where denial is too large, i. e., denies the whole where only
a part is alleged as a cause of action or defense, the denial
is demurrable.
VI. A denial must be of substantial matter and not raise merely
immaterial issues.
(a) A denial of matters improperly alleged in a declaration
not necessary.
(b) If declaration puts in issue immaterial matters and the
plea traverses these matters, they must be proven.
i. Unnecessary averments such as that the defendant be-
ing of full age executed a bond, a traverse admitting
the execution of the bond but denying full age, raises
an issue which must be submitted to the jury.
VII. A plea alleging a general fact and the reply denying this
fact and alleging the true facts, demurrer to the reply will
vitiate the original plea.
VIII. If pleading is limited in its allegations of a particular fact,
denial of the limited fact is sufficient.
IX. A special plea may deny part of the issue without being de-
murrable. This is the difference between pleading a gen-
eral and a special issue.
X. Where a plea consists of several material allegations, one of
which is traversed and found for plaintiff, there is an end
of the plea altogether.
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AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER OR PLEAS IN CON-
FESSION AND AVOIDANCE.
I. This plea must both confess and avoid. An entire plea cannot
be good in part and bad in another part, because not di-
visible.
II. Confession may be pleaded by inference so as to allow direct
allegations of avoidance.
III. A plea which either confesses or avoids, but does not do
both is insufficient.
(a) By not confessing but merely avoiding, plea leaves ma-
terial part of the declaration unanswered and hence is
bad.
IV. If the avoidance is positively stated the confession may be
hypothetically stated.
i. At common law a hypothetical plea was defective in
form and a special demurrer to it was sustained. The
decisions, however, on this point are not uniform.
V. In every plea material facts should be alleged directly and
positively so as to bring the controversy to a precise and
definite issue.
i. While confession can be inferentially or hypothetically
pleaded avoidance cannot.
VI. Statements contained in a special plea which has been held
bad are not admissible as evidence on the general issue.
VII. If the declaration alleges facts constituting an affirmative
defense, this does not prevent the plea setting up such de-
fense.
x. It is always bad practice to allege in the declaration an
anticipated affirmative defense. The plaintiff gains noth-
ing thereby neither does the defendant lose anything.
(a) A declaration stating a cause of action and also facts
constituting a defense is bad on demurrer.
VIII. The plea of an estoppel is not a confession of the cause
of action because it neither admits nor denies but alleges
new matter which denies the right of the opposite party
to insist on his claim.
i. The very notion of an estoppel is that the plea to which
it is interposed cannot at law be set up in the particular
action. The estoppel therefore cannot be relied upon as
an admission of the facts.
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IX. A declaration should not contain defensive matters which
would be waived by a defendant unless he pleaded them.
i. There is a division in the authorities on the question
whether a declaration setting out matters defeating a
claim because of the statute of limitations is good or
bad. Some authorities hold that such declaration is
good at law and in equity.
2. If the declaration does not indicate that the bar of the
statute has attached, the objection must be taken by an
answer.
DILA TORY PLEAS.
I. If declaration disclose misjoinder of plaintiffs, defendant may
demur, move in arrest of judgment or sue out writ of
error.
i. At common law if the declaration discloses a misjoinder
of plaintiffs the defendant might demur, move in arrest
of judgment after verdict, or proceed by writ of error
after judgment on the ground that the declaration was
not sufficient in law since it did not state a joint cause
of action in favor of all plaintiffs.
2. By statute misjoinder of plaintiffs is no longer a ground
for demurrer but for a motion to strike out the su-
perfluous party or parties.
3. If there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, but not ap-
parent on the face of the declaration, the defendant
can usually raise the objection by a negative plea, for
the plaintiffs will rarely be able to prove their allega-
tion of a joint right in contract or tort of all the plain-
tiffs against the defendants.
4. The party improperly made a defendant may demur not
on the ground of a misjoinder of defendants, but be-
cause the declaration does not state a cause of action
against him.
5. If one improperly joined as a defendant fails to demur
when he might properly do so, he waives the objection.
6. At common law if the declaration in an action on con-
tract did not disclose the actual misjoinder of the de-
fendants, the defendant under a general denial might
move for a nonsuit on the ground of variance or obtain
a verdict in his favor.
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7. By the common law the joinder of superfluous persons
as defendants in actions upon a joint tort is no ground
of objection by those properly made defendants. A ver-
dict and judgment was given against those properly
joined and in favor of those improperly joined.
II. Unless non-joinder of parties is pleaded in abatement, the
fault cannot be taken advantage of on a plea of the general
issue, on demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment or writ
of error.
i. At common law the non-joinder of a necessary party
plaintiff, if apparent on the face of the declaration, was
ground for demurrer, a motion in arrest of judgment
or a writ of error because the declaration did not dis-
close a cause of action in favor of the actual plaintiff
or plaintiffs but only a cause of action in favor of a
group or larger group of persons.
2. The declaration disclosing the non-joinder of an essen-
tial party is demurrable although it does not appear
that such party is alive. To save the declaration the
plaintiff must allege the death of the one not joined.
3. A party may demur for the non-joinder of another only
when he is interested in having that other joined.
4. If the declaration is demurrable for defect of parties
plaintiff the objection is waived if not taken by de-
murrer. It cannot be taken by answer.
5. Under the common law the objection of non-joinder of
plaintiffs in action for tort can be taken only by a plea
in abatement. In actions on contract if the non-joinder
of necessary parties defendant appears from the declara-
tion and it also appears that they are alive and in the
jurisdiction, the declaration is bad on demurrer because
not containing a cause of action against the actual de-
fendant or defendants.
6. If the defect of parties is not apparent on the face of
the declaration the objection must be taken by a plea in
abatement, in cases of contract under seal. Upon a
simple contract, it was formerly a ground for non-suit
but now may be taken by a plea in abatement.
III. A defense of prior action pending or decided being an af-
firmative defense, must be specially pleaded.
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i. Under the common law the objection of a prior action
pending must be taken by a plea in abatement and be-
fore pleading to the merits.
2. Pleas in abatement have been abolished in England and
if an action is brought while another is pending, the
defendant may apply for a stay of proceedings in one
or the other of the two actions.
3. The plea or answer of a prior action pending must make
clear that the two causes of action are identical and
between the same parties or their privies. The requi-
sites of such plea or answer are: (i) That the prior
action was pending at the time the second action was
brought; (2) That it is still pending at the time of the
plea or answer; (3)The identity of the cause of action
and of the parties; (4) The designation of the court in
which the prior action is pending; and (5) A reference
to the record of the prior action.
DEPARTURE.
Definition.
A departure is the statement of matter in a reply, replication,
rejoinder or subsequent pleading as a cause of action or defense
which is not pursuant to the previous pleading of the same party
and which does not support and fortify it.
Another.
Where a party quits or departs from the case or defense
which he first made, and has recourse to another; when one case
or defense is abandoned or departed from, which was first made
and recourse had to another; when the second plea contradicts
the first plea and does not contain matter pursuant to it going to
support and fortify it.
The Test.
Is the question whether evidence of facts alleged in the subse-
quent pleading could be received under the allegations of the
previous pleading. If such evidence could not be received, there
is a departure.
Examples of departure by plaintiff:
Declaration alleging performance, answer non-per-
formance, and reply sets out excuse for non-performance.
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Declaration alleging delivery, answer denies and reply
alleges tender and refusal.
Departure by defendant:
Performance pleaded in answer, reply denies and re-
joinder sets forth matter excusing performance.
Answer denies an award, reply asserts it and rejoinder
alleges incomplete award or award not properly tendered.
Answer alleges plaintiff not injured, reply that he was,
rejoinder that plaintiff was injured but had no legal claim
or that plaintiff was injured by his own wrong.
I. In a subsequent pleading a party cannot shift his cause of ac-
tion or defense from that alleged in a prior pleading.
II. If the opposite party takes issue with a pleading amounting
to a departure, a verdict cures the fault. Advantage of
the fault must be taken by demurrer or other appropriate
plea.
III. If the plaintiff founds his cause of action upon the common
law and replies by relying on a statute, there is departure.
IV. Where the second pleading supports by inference even the
first pleading there is no departure.
NEW ASSIGNMENT.
When a declaration or complaint is too general or vague and
defendant has pleaded to a grievance other than that intended by
plaintiff, a pleading in reply with more definiteness and exactness
is a new assignment. A new assignment is limited to a reply or
replication and generally occurs in actions for trespass in the de-
scription of property or place.
I. Where the declaration is so general as to apply to several
situations and the plea meets one of them, but not the one
intended by the declaration, there ought to be a new as-
signment.
II. When declaration describes a close by a certain name, plea
claims a close by the same name owned by defendant, reply
that close owned by defendant not the one intended, no
new assignment is necessary.
III. If the declaration rests on debt and the plea is payment
then no new assignment is necessary, although payment
pleaded exceeds the amount stated in the declaration.
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i. If the defendant identifies the debt as growing out of a
particular contract and pleads payment of such debt,
the plaintiff must new assign if he wishes to recover
on a debt arising from some other contract.
IV. Amplification of the original cause of action is not allowed
under the guise of a new assignment.
V. If the plea justifies the whole trespass and plaintiff relies on
trespass exceeding the time specified in the justification, a
new assignment is necessary.
VI. Where the plea is justification going to the gist of the action
in trespass, it is necessary newly to assign matters of ag-
gravation if relied on.
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS.
England, 1883, Court Rule. The court or a judge may, at any
state of the proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend his
pleadings, in such manner and upon such terms as may be just,
and all such amendments shall be made that may be necessary
for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy
between the parties.
Wisconsin Statute, Section 2830: The court, may upon the
trial, or at any other stage of the action, before or after judgment,
in furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be just,
amend any process, pleading or proceeding by adding to, striking
out, the name of any party or by correcting a mistake in the name
of a party, or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other
allegations material to the case, or, when the amendment does
not change substantially the claim or defense, by conforming the
pleading or proceedings to the facts proved.
Wisconsin, Chapter 353, Laws of i911: The court, in its dis-
cretion, and on such terms as may be just, may allow the pleading
to be amended regardless of whether it will change the nature
of the action from one at law to one in equity, or from one on
contract to one in tort, or vice versa, provided the pleading, as
amended, states a cause of action arising out of the same con-
tract or transaction, or is connected with the same subject.
I. Amendments which prejudice the rights of the opposite party
as they existed at the date of the amendment are not al-
lowed.
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I. Examples of amendment not allowed: Declaration for
money payable on demand - amendment to repay after
a certain event; declaration for negligent running of
train -amendment for negligent equipment; declara-
tion in slander for malpractice - amendment for call-
ing plaintiff quack; declaration on contract for fixed
price - amendment for quantum reruit.
II. If amendment introduces a new cause of action, the date of
the running of the statute of limitations is the date of
amendment and not that of the original declaration.
III. A declaration may be amended to recite the law of another
state, if it stated a cause of action in the first place.
i. Examples of permissible amendments: Declaration for
negligence - amendment alleging absence of contribu-
tory negligence; declaration on insurance policy -
amendment alleging performance of condition prece-
dent; declaration against endorsee - amendment to al-
lege notice of dishonor.
IV. Where original declaration fails in a material matter, amend-
ment cannot be allowed to bar the defense of the statute of
limitations.
(a) A declaration on money had and received, money
loaned and money paid on behalf of the princi-
pal, cannot be amended to count on a guaranty. Such
amendment would exonerate the bail.
i. The test whether an amendment is allowable or not is
whether evidence to sustain the amended declaration
would have been admissible to support the original dec-
laration.
V. A substitution of a party defendant for the one originally
named may be made by amendment.
VI. The character in which a party sues or is sued may be
changed by amendment.
VII. A superfluous party may be eliminated by amendment.
VIII. All parties to be bound by the judgment must have notice
of the amendments to the declaration.
IX. Leave to amend before answer by stating an additional cause
of action of the same nature and arising out of the same
transaction set out in the declaration will be granted.
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i. Cases where leave to amend were allowed although
amendment introduced a new cause of action: Count
for partition by sale - amended to count for partition
without sale; count on false warranty of title-
amended to count for fraud inducing purchase of land;
count upon a negligent injury - amended to count upon
a wilful injury; count for work and labor -amended
to count for breach of express contract; count on
breach of contract - amended to count for restitution
of consideration.
2. Amendment should be allowed which does not intro-
duce a new cause of action, where the new count merely
amplifies or varies in non-essential matters the original
count; as for example, amended count dropping a co-
defendant in actions of tort; count upon note amended
to count upon conditional note; count on special con-
tract- amended to count on quantum rneruit.
X. Amendments to cure defects of substance in the declaration
will not be allowed; of form, they will be.
i. Examples of what has been held defects of substance
and amendment not allowed: count for breach of con-
tract - amended to count for negligent tort; count for
fraud -amended to count for mistake; count upon an
account - amended to count on breach of warranty;
count for libel - amended to count for malicious prose-
cution; count for conversion of money-amended to
count for money had and received.
XI. Amendments should be allowed even though injury result to
the opposite party, if such injury can be compensated by
costs or otherwise; if compensation is impossible, then
such amendments are not allowed.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.
Common Law. It was necessary in case the defendant de-
sired to rely upon a counterclaim to state specifically the facts
tending to support such defense, and if on the trial a set-off or
counterclaim is established, the amount thereof was set off against
the claim of the plaintiff, if the latter sustained the same, or if
the claims of the defendant exceeded that of the plaintiff he had
judgment for the excess.
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Statutes. A defendant may counterclaim upon a cause of ac-
tion arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the com-
plaint or, in an action arising on contract, any other cause of
action also arising on contract and existing at the commencement
of the action. But a counterclaim must be pleaded as such and
be so denominated and a demand of judgment thereon must be
made.
I. Reply to set-off may now contain two defenses which under
the common law would have been objectionable as double.
II. If plaintiff does not answer a set-off pleaded, he is in default
and if he discontinues his action, judgment will go against
him.
i. Pleading a set-off is in effect a cross action against
plaintiff and not, strictly speaking, a defense.
2. The set-off must state a cause of action the same as a
declaration and being introduced as a plea or answer,
the plaintiff must reply or be in default.
MOTIONS BASED ON PLEADING.
Motion in Arrest of Judgment.
I. Any matter going to the merits of the case may be shown in
arrest of judgment if the motion is made between the
award and the perfected judgment.
II. A judgment cannot be arrested, except for substantial errors
apparent upon the face of the record.
i. A motion in arrest of judgment cannot be based on ex-
trinsic matter and extrinsic matter cannot be made part
of the record by the motion papers.
III. The sufficiency of the declaration can be challenged on a mo-
tion in arrest of judgment.
i. When a declaration states a ground of action defec-
tively, a verdict cures the defect, but when it wholly
fails to state a cause of action, verdict does not cure.
IV. When any material fact necessary to state a cause of action
is neither directly nor inferentially stated, the judgment
will be arrested, but if such fact though not expressly
stated, can be implied from what is stated, judgment will
not be arrested.
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V. After judgment on demurrer, the defendant cannot raise the
same question on motion in arrest of judgment This rule
does not apply in cases of judgment by default or where
the error arises on verdict or subsequent proceedings.
(This is not the universal rule.)
VI. If some counts of a declaration are good 'and some bad, and
there is a general verdict, the judgment will be arrested.
VII. Where two good counts are misjoined in a declaration, and
there is a general verdict, the judgment will be arrested.
i. If two good counts are improperly joined and the ver-
dict is for the plaintiff in one and for the defendant in
the other, judgment will not be arrested but will be
given in accordance with the verdict.
2. If damages are assessed separately upon counts im-
properly joined, the plaintiff may have judgment upon
the counts that might properly be joined and judgment
arrested on the other counts.
Motion for Judgment Before or Notuithstanding the Verdict.
I. On motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the rec-
ord must be produced and the motion cannot be based on
affidavits.
II. Where a verdict is given defendant on an insufficient plea,
judgment for plaintiff will be given on a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict.
III. After issue joined, non-suit will not be granted defendant on
accoufit of a defective declaration. He should demur or
move in arrest of judgment.
ERROR AND APPEAL ON THE PLEADINGS.
I. Error that can be cured by motion in arrest of judgment can
be reached by writ of error.
II. On writ of error only errors appearing upon the face of the
record will be considered.
i. The assignments of error and the papers used as evi-
dence are no part of the record.
III. Unless a party has been prejudiced by the action of the trial
court writ of error is unavailable.
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PLEADINGS IN PARTICULAR ACTIONS-
CONTRACTS.
Specialty and Simple Contracts.
(a) Covenant or debt on specialty. Necessary alegations.
I. In action on simple contract declaration must allege the con-
sideration. In action on a specialty such allegation is un-
necessary.
i. In declaring upon a bill or note it is not necessary to
allege delivery. It is enough to state that the defendant
made or endorsed the bill or note, the delivery being
thereby implied.
II. In action on a specialty the sealing of the instrument need
not be alleged, because it is implied.
i. In declaring upon such instrument, the sealing is in-
ferred for otherwise there is no writing obligatory.
III. Strained inferences will not be placed on the allegations of a
declaration even to sustain the pleading.
IV. If the contract declared on contains exceptions or reserva-
tions, the declaration must aver these reservations or ex-
ceptions or upon their being afterwards proven a fatal
variance results.
i. If the exception is incorporated in the general clause
of a contract, party relying on such clause must set out
the exception.
2. If there is a general clause and a separate and distinct
clause contains exceptions, a party relying on the gen-
eral clause need not set out the exceptions.
V. Provisos furnishing matters of excuse need not be negatived
by declaration. Pleas must aver them. Exceptions must
be negatived.
i. The proviso forms no part of plaintiff's cause of action.
It is merely affirmative defensive matter.
VI. Covenants must be set out in full, and if a qualification forms
part of a covenant it must be alleged.
(b) Special Assumpsit - Necessary Allegations.
I. In actions on oral contract the declaration must allege the con-
sideration. Want of such allegation is not cured by ver-
dict.
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II. If consideration is alleged as a conclusion of law, it is insuffi-
cient on demurrer; but if issue is joined on such pleading,
verdict cures the defect.
III. Where declaration in assumpsit alleges agreement to do a
number of things, but verdict finds only an agreement to
do one or several, but not all, judgment must go for de-
fendant.
IV. Under common law an undertaking to pay the past debt of
another must be based on a consideration and a declaration
on a guaranty must allege a consideration.
V. In declaring on contract, the declaration must truly describe
the contract and according to its legal effect and any ma-
terial variance will be fatal.
i. While only material parts of the contract need be al-
leged, if the parts omitted qualify the parts set out, the
omission is fatal.
(a) In an action on an insurance contract only so much
need be alleged as will show a right to recover.
i. The various limitations, conditions, etc., contained in
the policy are defensive matter and must be pleaded by
defendant.
(b) A declaration cannot count on absolute contract when
in fact the contract is conditional.
i. A general allegation that plaintiff has performed all
things and kept all conditions is insufficient.
2. The general averment of performance of conditions
precedent is insufficient; the performance of each con-
dition must be alleged with particularity.
3. A defendant who wishes to put the plaintiff to proving
the performance of any condition must specifically deny
the performance of the particular condition, a general
denial of such general averment of performance being
insufficient.
VII. In an action on a note, evidence of a waiver of demand
supports the allegation of demand and notice.
VIII. In an action on contract the breach thereof must be alleged.
IX. In an action an official bond payment of the obligation for
which bond was given may be proven under a general
denial.
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i. A general denial puts in issue more than the non-execu-
tion of the bond. It also denies conversion and payment
is evidence of non-conversion.
Defenses.
I. The defense of failure of consideration must be specially
pleaded.
II. In assumpsit pleading the statute of frauds is in fact pleading
non-assumpsit but is an untrue and argumentative denial
of the contract and hence bad.
i. Non-compliance with the statute of frauds is not a plea
like that of fraud, usury, gaming, infancy or forfeiture,
which are pleas amounting to confession and avoidance.
2. Plaintiff need not show in his declaration upon a claim
included within the statute of frauds that its provisions
have been complied with.
3. The defendant is allowed to show a non-compliance
with the statute of fraud under a general denial of the
contract.
III. Bills of exchange and promissory notes are exceptions to the
rule that in actions on simple contract the consideration
must be alleged. This exception is created by statute.
IV. Infancy makes a note voidable but not void and cannot be
shown under a general denial.
TORT ACTIONS - TRESPASS.
Scope of the Action.
I. Where the injury is the direct result of the agency used to
commit the trespass, action for trespass is the proper
remedy.
II. Declaration in form vi et armis, but only alleging consequen-
tial damages, is bad on demurrer.
i. While an action on the case will lie wherever trespass
lies, the converse is not true.
2. Trespass will lie whenever the injury is the direct re-
sult of the act complained of.
3. Trespass on the case will lie if injury, in law, is not
forcible or not the direct result of the act complained of
but only consequential.
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III. One not directly connected with the trespass cannot be liable
therefor unless he ratifies the same and consents thereto.
i. One who takes by trespass from a trespasser is liable.
2. A bailee is not liable in trespass for wrongful acts af-
fecting the property done after the termination of the
bailment.
IV. Where the damages are neither intentional, nor direct, nor
immediate, trespass will not lie.
V. Where facts alleged show lawful arrest but wrongful obtain-
ing of the process, the action should be for malicious
prosecution, and not for false imprisonment.
VI. Trespass quare clausuin fregit can be brought only by the
person in possession, actual or constructive, because the
gist of the action is the injury to the possession.
i. If premises are occupied the action must be brought by
the party occupying the same; if unoccupied, by the
party having title and right of possession.
Necessary Allegations.
I. Mere technical and formal allegations necessary in criminal ac-
tions, are not necessary in civil cases.
i. Vi et armis was necessary under the common law be-
cause the civil action was also the criminal process.
These words are not necessary now.
2. False imprisonment lies for detention manifestly illegal
while in malicious prosecution the arrest and detention
is legal.
3. The gravamen of false imprisonment is the unlawful
detention, while of malicious prosecution it is the malice
and want of probable cause.
II. In actions of trespass allegation of ownership is sustained by
any proof of any form of ownership. Mere right of posses-
sion is sufficient against everybody but the owner.
Defenses.
I. Under a general denial for injury by trespass, evidence that
the injury was the result of an accident is not admissible.
i. If the injury was due to accident then defendant con-
fesses the trespass and should have pleaded the avoid-
ance.
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II. Under a general denial in trespass quare clausum fregit evi-
dence of title and of right of possession in the defendant
may be given.
i. Possession or right of possession in plaintiff is neces-
sary to sustain his cause of action and showing title and
right of possession in the defendant defeats the action
and can be shown under the general issue.
III. A special plea amounting to the general issue is insufficient.
i. Whether a plea amounts to the general issue is deter-
mined by whether it takes away all color for maintain-
ing the action in compelling plaintiff to prove a nega-
tive in the first instance.
2. Such special pleas are bad unless the express color for
action be given by alleging that plaintiff has a defective
title.
IV. Matters of justification in actions for a tort must be specially
pleaded.
V. Where the act complained of is prima facie a trespass any
matter of justification or excuse must be specially pleaded.
i. The plea of justification is pleaded only where the de-
fendant is a trespasser, but under this plea it may not be
shown that plaintiff was not entitled to possession while
defendant was in constructive possession, the actual pos-
session being in plaintiff.
VI. Under the plea of the general issue advantage cannot be
taken of the defense of the statute of limitations. This
statute must be specially pleaded.
EJECTMENT.
Scope of the Action.
I. In jectment a mere trespasser cannot set up a title in another
than the plaintiff as a defense.
i. To maintain ejectment the plaintiff must show some-
thing more than a mere right to possession except as
against a mere intruder.
II. To maintain ejectment plaintiff need not necessarily show a
possession of twenty years or a paper title. Possession for
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less than twenty years will raise a presumption sufficient to
put the defendant upon his defense.
i. Unless a prior possession is shown, a subsequent posses-
sion will raise the presumption of title unless the second
possession was acquired by a mere entry without lawful
right.
Necessary Allegations.
I. In ejectment the plaintiff must correctly allege his estate in the
land he seeks to recover.
i. Thus declaring upon an estate in fee is not established
by showing a life estate.
II. The declaration must allege that plaintiff was possessed of the
land before he was dispossessed thereof, or that a right of
possession accured in him before the defendant entered
thereupon.
Defenses.
I. A special plea or special pleas amounting to the general issue
in ejectment are demurrable.
i. Under the common law the only plea permitted in eject-
ment was not guilty and under this plea evidence was
generally admitted to establish the facts later sought to
be pleaded under special pleas.
II. Special pleas merely alleging the negative of what the plain-
tiff must prove are superfluous.
i. Special pleas containing unnecessary and superfluous
matter should be disregarded or stricken out but not
demurred to.
III. A plea denying possession, but not denying the right to pos-
session, is demurrable.
i. Such pleas answer only a part of the declaration though
professing to answer the whole and hence are obnoxious.
IV. In ejectment the plaintiff must show a right of possession as
well as title and if the title of his grantor was barred by
the statute of limitations, he cannot recover.
I. Ejectment is a possessory action and lies only where
the lessor of the plaintiff might enter and hence in such
case plaintiff must show his lessor's right to enter by
showing possession in the latter within twenty years.
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ACTIONS ON THE CASE.
Scope of the Action.
I. The gist of the action on the case is not a failure to perform
but a failure to perform in a proper manner.
i. Even though the action grows out of a contract, if it is
based on want of skill and diligence implied in every
instance where one is employed by reason of his skill
and diligence, it is a tort action since the gravamen of
the action is the breach of this duty.
II. A declaration alleging facts sustaining an action for money
had and received states a cause of action ex contractu and
not ex delicto.
i. Where a declaration alleges the breach of duty in not
paying over money after .demand, this is an allegation
for the recovery of money had and received.
2. If allegation in such action that failure to pay over the
money was with intent to defraud made such action one
sounding in tort, it would destroy the distinction be-
tween actions on contract and those in tort.
Necessary Allegations.
I. In actions on the case by reversioner, a declaration alleging
facts injurious to the possession rather than necessarily to
the reversion, is insufficient.
i. Such defect will not be cured by verdict because it is
too serious and material.
II. In an action for injury to easements the right to the easement
need not be alleged as a prescriptive one since it may arise
in any way as long as it exists at -all.
i. Merely alleging the existence of an easement is suffi-
cient and general averments of possession and right to
the easement are also sufficient.
III. In actions for negligence, facts showing a duty owing and
failure to perform such duty must be alleged.
I. In such cases the relationship between plaintiff and de-
fendant and the consequent duty owing must be set out
because a trespasser could not recover.
IV. In actions for wrongful death, two causes of action arising
by reason thereof one for the estate and the other for the
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widow and next of kin, ihe declaration must allege whether
the action is brought for the estate or for the widow, and
if for the latter, that the deceased left a widow and next of
kin surviving him.
i. In actions of this kind necessary allegations are, i, the
death of the deceased in this state; 2, due to the tor-
tious act of the defendant; 3, that plaintiff is the per-
sonal representative of the deceased, if for the estate,
and if for the widow and next of kin, that deceased left
them surviving.
2. Such action could not be brought under the common
law and hence is strictly a statutory action.
V. In actions for negligence a declaration must set out the negli-
gent acts which are the proximate cause of the injury.
Pleading mere legal conclusions is insufficient.
VI. Only the duty or duties alleged in the declaration to have
been violated can be proven, although evidentiary facts
should not be alleged.
VII. In actions for negligence, contributory negligence is a de-
fense and the declaration need not allege the exercise of
due care.
VIII. In actions for personal injury the declaration need not
negative that injury was caused by the neglect of a fellow
servant because negligence of a fellow servant is an affirm-
ative defense.
IX. In actions for personal injury the declaration must negative
the assumption of a known risk or set out a sufficient ex-
cuse to take the case out of this doctrine.
X. Words in themselves harmless in order to become slan-
derous must be made -actionable by a colloquim directly
connecting them with the meaning alleged in the induce-
ment, and the ordinary and natural meaning of the words
must be susceptible of the construction put on them. In-
nuendoes cannot extend the sense or effect of -the words
used.
XI. The words claimed as defamatory must be set out in haec
verba.
i. The exact words must be set out so that the court and
the jury may determine their meaning and effect.
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XII. In libel and slander, under a general denial, proof of the
bad reputation of the plaintiff is not admissible.
XIII. To be actionable per se as charging a crime, the words
must necessarily impute a crime.
XIV. In libel and slander the declaration must allege publication
of the defamation to others than the plaintiff.
I. Libel or slander is an injury to the reputation and hence
a defamatory letter seen only by the plaintiff causes no
such injury.
XV. Where there is no such colloquium an innuendo, however
broad and comprehensive, cannot supply the defect.
i. An inducement explains that which is doubtfully ex-
pressed and to make doubtful matters clear; a collo-
quium shows that the words were spoken in reference
to the matter set out in the inducement; an innuendo is
explanatory of the subject matter sufficiently but am-
biguously expressed before.
XVI. In libel and slander the declaration must not only allege
the words used, but also that they were false and malicious.
i. Defamatory words are only actionable when false and
malicious and falsity and maliciousness must be averred
in some form. Malice is of the essence of the cause of
action.
XVII. In malicious prosecution the declaration must contain (i)
That defendant is responsible for the false charge made;
(2) What the charge was; (3) That the prosecution of the
plaintiff was without probable cause; (4) The favorable
termination of the prosecution.
XVIII. The necessary allegations of a declaration, in an action
for deceit are, (i) That false representations were made;
(2) That they were made with intent to defraud; (3)
That they were believed to be true and relied on and in-
duced the parting with the property; (4) That defendant
knew the representations were untrue; (5) That plaintiff
was damaged thereby, alleging the damages specially, and
(6) That the damages proximately followed from the de-
ception.
i. When several persons are charged with deceit an actual
participation by all or a conspiracy to defraud should
be alleged.
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XIX. In deceit intent to defraud must be alleged and that the
false representation was the proximate cause of damages
and that the representation was in fact false.
Defenses.
I. In actions for obstructing the easement of right of way, the
general issue denies plaintiff's right of way as well as the
fact of obstruction by the defendant.
i. On this point there is an essential difference between
actions of trespass and trespass on the case. In the
former, matters in excuse or justification must be
specially pleaded; in the latter, they need not be
pleaded because the plaintiff must recover upon the
justice and equity of his case.
2. In actions on the case the general issue is a denial of
the whole cause of action and every essential fact al-
leged in the declaration, which plaintiff must prove to
establish his case.
II. Limitations which operate as an absolute bar to the action
need not be negatived in the declaration if enough is al-
leged to show that such bar does not in fact apply.
TROVER.
Scope of the Action.
I. If bailee violates terms of the bailment the right to immediate
possession revives in the owner and the latter may main-
tain trover, if conversion occurs by reason of and at the
time of the violating of such terms.
II. In trover naked possession is sufficient against anyone but
the true owner. If possession, however, is surrendered,
such fact will not support the action. Neither can there be
conversion where the taking is consented to.
i. Naked possession, however obtained, is sufficient against
a stranger. Surrender thereof destroys such title and
surrender under protest does not protect such title.
2. Where taking is by consent there is no conversion and
under such circumstances a demand and refusal is no
evidence of conversion.
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Necessary Allegations.
I. A declaration in trover must allege title or other right to im-
mediate possession in the plaintiff.
II. A declaration in trover alleging property in goods, does not
necessarily mean absolute ownership, but such relation to
the property as to entitle the plaintiff to possession.
i. General allegations of conversion permit evidence of
such unjustified dealing with the property as shows a
wrongful taking and disposal of it, prejudicial to the
right of plaintiff.
Defenses.
!. In trover a defendant must plead a former judgment in order
to avail himself of this defense.
II. In declaring in trover plaintiff need not set out the nature of
his title, such as that he received it by an assignment of
the cause of action.
REPLEVIN.
Scope of the Action.
I. Answering in replevin it is sufficient to allege title to the prop-
erty in question in a third person.
i. Whether a defendant or a stranger has the title is im-
material since the plaintiff has not.
II. In replevin the declaration must aver a general or special
title in the plaintiff and the right of immediate possession.
Hence a plea of title in a stranger is sufficient.
i. While possession is sufficient for trespass, it is not in
replevin.
III. Replevin will not lie for severed fixtures where the plaintiff
is out of possession of the realty when the severance oc-
curred. If he was in possession at such time it will lie.
i. Replevin will not lie where a plaintiff must prove prop-
erty in the chattel by proving property in the realty,
unless he is in possession of the latter at the time the
chattel was severed from the realty.
IV. Replevin will lie only against a defendant who has the pos-
session or the control of the goods or chattels.
COMMON LAW PLEADING
i. Attached goods are in the legal custody and possession
of the officer only and an attaching creditor has no
property, special or general, in the goods, no right of
possession and hence no cause of action against a third
party who takes them from the officer or destroys them.
V. The owner of personal property in the actual possession of
another and taken from such other under process against
him, can maintain replevin and the officer cannot exonerate
himself by showing that plaintiff failed to establish his
title in another proceeding.
i. The question of title may be litigated in the replevin
action even if the plaintiff failed to establish his title in
another proceeding.
2. An officer must at his peril, seize the goods of the ex-
ecution debtor and not those of a stranger. Possession
by a bailee is the possession of the owner.
Necessary Allegations.
I. In replevin the declaration must aver title or interest in goods
in the plaintiff, and not the evidence of title or of interest.
i. If it were otherwise a traverse would merely traverse
the evidence of title or interest and not the fact.
II. In replevin the declaration must allege the unlawful taking
of the property by the defendant as well as the unlawful
detention.
Defenses.
I. Under a plea of non cepit, the plaintiff need not prove title or
right of possession because that is admitted, the only issue
being the taking and detention. Under such plea plaintiff
need not prove an unlawful taking because, title being ad-
mitted, any taking is unlawful.
i. The taking and carrying away of the personal property
of another is trespass and evidence of detention is proof
of an unlawful taking.
II. The plea of non detinet puts in issue the right of property
and the right of possession of the plaintiff.
I. Under the general plea all the necessary rights of plain-
tiff are put in issue and if plaintiff fails in any of them
defendant must recover.
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III. In replevin a plea may set up non cepit, property in the de-
fendant or in a stranger, although these pleas are incon-
sistent.
i. The plaintiff must show right of possession in himself,
and to meet this a defendant may interpose and prove
inconsistent pleas.
IV. Under a plea of property in another than plaintiff, the de-
fendant may show that the title or the claim to right of
possession of the plaintiff was fraudulently obtained.
i. It is not necessary under this plea specially to allege
fraud.
2. Under the common law, if the plaintiff fails to show
title, it was immaterial, whether the defendant showed
title in himself or not.
3. A plaintiff, who knows what title he has, showing title
by a transfer of a questionable nature, is not surprised
when his title is attacked for fraud.
4. Replevin is a proper action to test title and anybody
who claims an interest in the property may enter the
contest.
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WISCONSIN.
PART THREE.
THE THEORY OF ADMISSIBILITY.
I. Multiple admissibility.
i. The principle of multiple admissibility is that evidence may
be admissible for one purpose and not for one or more
other purposes. From this principle it follows:
A. That an offer of evidence made generally should be re-
ceived if admissible for some purpose, even though it
would be inadmissible if offered for some other pur-
pose.
B. But if you make an offer for a specific purpose, for
which purpose it is not admissible, and the judge re-
jects it, that rejection is correct even though it would
be admissible for some other purpose.
II. Curative admissibility.
i. The principle of curative admissibility is that you can ad-
mit anything to cure erroneous admission of irrelevant
evidence on the other side.
